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Kessler: The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigat

THE TREATMENT OF PRELIMINARY ISSUES OF
FACT IN CONSPIRACY LITIGATIONS: PUTTING
THE CONSPIRACY BACK INTO THE
COCONSPIRATOR RULE
Lawrence W. Kessler*
Statements of one member of a conspiracy are frequently

admitted as evidence of the guilt of the other participants. Ordinary barriers to the submission of such unsworn, out-of-court
utterances are circumvented by classifying the statements as vicarious admissions. This classification is authorized by an evidentiary rule which parallels the substantive law of conspiracy.
The evidentiary doctrine detailing the admissibility of this evidence is the coconspirator rule. For purposes of the admission of
evidence, as well as for purposes of ultimate criminal responsibility, the acts and declarations of one are the acts and declarations

of all.
The coconspirator exception is not a recent addition to the
law.' Categorization of admissions as nonhearsay seems to have
arisen from the fact that they were not encompassed by the original hearsay rule. 2 In 1827 the Supreme Court of the United
States, in an agency case, adopted this categorization. 3 The vicarious admission-the coconspirator rule-has developed from this
agency law.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School; B.A., 1964, J.D., 1967, Columbia
University. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Edward M. Schoenman for
his invaluable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 657, 658 (1896); Clune v. United
States, 159 U.S. 590, 593 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 308, 309 (1892);
American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 365 (1829); United States v.
Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827); Patton v. Freeman, 1 N.J.L. 113 (1791).
2. See Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1159, 1162 (1954); 4 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1076-87, at 152 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Morgan, Admissions as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921).
3. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827):
So, in cases of conspiracy and riot, when once the conspiracy or combination is
established, the act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the enterprise, is
considered the act of all, and is evidence against all.
The "acts" there in question were declarations which were admitted as evidence against
the nondeclarant.

4. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1917);
United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bernard,
287 F.2d 715, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Qiweiss, 138 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir.
1943); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926). See also 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1076-87, at 152 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).

77

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 5

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1976]

The present rule authorizes the admission of the statements
of one conspirator as evidence of the guilt of his alleged confederates if four preliminary facts can be proven. The facts must show
that the statement was made (1) during and (2) in furtherance
of the conspiracy, (3) that the conspiracy existed, and (4) that the
nondeclarant coconspirator was a member thereof.' Although the
courts do not talk of the reliability problem, the complexity of
this coconspirator rule must be attributed to a silent realization
that the statements must be screened. Thus, the plethora of preliminary facts are designed to achieve this goal.
The coconspirator rule parallels the traditional agency exception to the hearsay rules. Initially the preliminary factors were
identical.' It is no coincidence that the logical basis for the substantive conspiracy rules rests in agency. Joinder in crime forms
the agency relationship which justifies the attribution of the
statement to the nondeclarant.
It is not the substance but the implementation of this concept that created the issues which will be the focus of this article.
The source of the difficulties is the tension between the pragmatic
policy underlying admission of this type of statement' and the
traditional evidentiary policy prohibiting jury reliance on untrustworthy testimony. Traditional evidentiary policy prevents
the introduction into evidence of potentially unreliable out-ofcourt statements. The pragmatic policy of admissions permits
introduction into evidence of essential testimony despite its potential unreliability. These tensions surface in the determination
of issues of preliminary fact.
5. These four factors may be collapsed into three-duration, furtherance, and foundation. Foundation means proof by independent evidence of the conspiracy and of the
defendant's connection thereto. See, e.g., Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735 & n.21
(9th Cir. 1963).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 & n.14 (1974) (substantial
independent evidence of conspiracy required); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
443 (1949) (must be in furtherance and during pendency); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 74 (1942) (must be proof aliunde of conspiracy and defendant's connection with
it).
7. The preliminary factors of the traditional agency rule are independent proof of the
authorization, the identity of the declarant, and proof that the declaration was made
during and within the scope of the agency. C. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 267, at 640 (2d ed.
Cleary 1972). The last requirement has now been modified. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(D)
(1975).
8. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Developments in the Law-CriminalConspiracy, 72 HARV.
L. REv. 920, 988, 989 (1959).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss1/5

2

Kessler: The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigat

The Coconspirator Rule

Although the resolution of such problems raises technical
issues, the result of the litigation often depends on these very
issues. In fact, the exploration of this area will reveal how the
implementation of a solution based purely on an analysis of the
evidentiary rules has disrupted the traditional balance between
the conflicting policies to the detriment of the rights of the defendant.
It is the thesis of this article that the admissibility of coconspirators' statements is a matter that must be decided by the
jury. This approach, which is the traditional mode, presently
competes for judicial favor with a revisionary rule. The revisionary rule places responsibility for deciding the preliminary issue
with the judge, and, in at least the Second Circuit, permits admission without proof sufficient to create a prima facie case. The
traditional approach better resolves the policy question. It is also
a procedure that is mandated by the Federal Rules of Evidence.9
The pertinent Rules are 104(b) and 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801
contains the coconspirator rule'0 exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule 104 structures the division of responsibility between judge
and jury." The traditional bifurcated procedure is mandated by
the meshing of these rules.
These apparently technical problems are of enormous significance in the conspiracy trial. Conspirator statements are often
the central evidence in the case.' 2 The vitality of the conspiracy
charge stems primarily from permissive evidentiary rules in conspiracy cases which have been deemed responsible for creating an
9.

FED.

R. EVID. 101-1103.

10. Under the Rules, an admission by a party opponent, which is defined to include
a statement by a party opponent's coconspirator made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is deemed to be nonhearsay and not an exception to the hearsay
rule. FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (2) (E). The assumption that such statements are not hearsay in
nature has been termed "naive." See Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REv.
1159, 1163-66 (1954). Indeed, courts have repeatedly and consistently discussed these
declarations as hearsay. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942); United States
v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683, 692 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Lucido, 486 F.2d 868, 870 (6th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1973); Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 1963).
11. Although the language of the Rule does not clearly indicate that a separation of
function is intended, where relevancy is conditioned on preliminary questions of fact, this
intent is vividly expressed in the commentary. FED. R. EvID. 104(b) (commentary); 1 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
104[01] (1975) [hereinafter cited as
WEINSTEIN & BERGER]. J. CROrCHErr & A. ELKIND, FEDERAL CouRTRooM EVIDENCE at 19
(1976).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), where the principal evidence against the defendant (Geaney) was testimony by a girlfriend of one coconspirator concerning incriminating statements made to her.
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excessive use of the conspiracy charge. 3 Thus, the amount of
preliminary proof that the prosecution is required to submit before the court will admit the statements into evidence against the
nondeclarant coconspirators may control the verdict. A high standard of proof may prevent the prosecution from proving its case.
On the other hand, if the standard is low, the defendant may be
convicted on unreliable evidence.'4
The major procedural change caused by the revision has been
the substitution of the judge for the jury as the decider of the
preliminary facts. The primary impact of the change is upon the
jury decision on the ultimate issues in the case. If the court decides the preliminary issues, passively submitting the coconspirator statements to the jury with other evidence, the jury may not
be alerted to the potential unreliability of this evidence." Without a charge requiring them to find independent evidence before
relying on the coconspirator statement, the jury is not deterred
from convicting solely upon that testimony. They may reject the
independent proof and still convict. Even though the sanctity of
the jury room cannot be pierced, the decision that, as a matter
of law, it is unnecessary to command the jurors to guard themselves against such evidence is significant.
Despite the long history of sanctioning the use of this type
of evidence, there is little basis for believing that such an utterance is inherently reliable." The declarant makes the statement
13. The coconspirator rule in particular makes the conspiracy charge popular with
prosecutors because it permits them to obtain an evidentiary advantage to strengthen
their case on the substantive charges. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 1925 Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 5-6; Comment, The Threat of Unfairness in Conspiracy Prosecutions:A Proposal for ProceduralReform, 2 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 7-8 (Summer 1972);
O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 263, 271 (1940).
14. See 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, %104[05].
15. The trial judge may charge the jury that the testimony is suspect-using language
akin to that of a charge on the credibility of accomplice testimony. Cf. United States v.
Apollo, 476 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1973). But by casting its warning as a mere caution
against the poor character of the declarant, the court does not communicate to the jury
the extent to which the law holds this type of testimony suspect. Such a palliative will

not suffice in the face of each potentially devastating vicarious admission. Even more
importantly, whether such a palliative is required is not at all clear from the cases. Unless
the reviewing court finds prejudice, the trial court may be able to refuse to give any charge.
Cf. United States v. Buschman, 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Beasley,
513 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1974).
16. Levie, Hearsayand Conspiracy,52 MICH. L. REv. 1159, 1165-66 (1954). See NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON EvIDENCE at 167 (1963):
To admit the hearsay statements of a co-conspirator merely because of a highly
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to further an avowedly criminal undertaking. When he refers to
a group of supporters who back him in the venture, or upon whom
his actions can be blamed, there is no compulsion for him to be
accurate.
In justifying this rule, the courts do not discuss directly the
probable reliability of such declarations. Instead, they resort to
the most technical agency arguments. Indeed, the true basis for
the rule is not a belief in the reliability of the statements, but the
17
doctrine of necessity.
In addition to these direct impacts upon the protection offered the defendant, his rights have been eroded by rules indirectly stemming from the revisionary procedure. These rules
sanction practices wholly conflicting with the policy authorizing
the evidentiary use of vicarious admissions. As will be discussed
later, the need to reverse the progeny of the revisionary procedure
is, in itself, a sufficient reason to return to the traditional practice.
THE COCONSPIRATOR RULE

In any discussion of the coconspirator rule it is appropriate
to consider the importance of evidentiary law to the vitality of the
substantive conspiracy law. The popularity of these laws in no
small part derives from the elimination of the burden of proving
an action by each member of the conspiracy, enabling prosecutors
18
to convict those criminals who act through others.
This socially desirable policy has been deemed to be of such
importance that the legal system has willingly sacrificed some
protection of the individual defendants. One aspect of the loss of
controversial belief that they are more likely to be true than not is insufficient.
Many of those who have closely studied the problem of conspiracy evidence are
in agreement that such evidence is highly unreliable. The hearsay statements
of alleged co-conspirators are perhaps the most suspect of all.
See also O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9
BROOKLYN L. REV. 263, 275 (1940), where it is noted that declarations of coconspirators
should be admissible "if they spring from [the conspiracy] and are made under circumstances which preclude the opportunity or idea of fictitious device or afterthought."

[Emphasis added.] But see

MODEL CODE OF EvmENCE Rule 508(b) Comment (1942); 4 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1080(a), at 195 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Morgan, The Rationale of

Vicarious Admissions, 42 HA'v. L. REv. 461 (1929). See also United States v. Renda, 56
F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1932).
17. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920, 989
(1959); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1159, 1166 (1954).
18. Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
IndividualDefendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276, 283-84 (1948). See also Developments in the
Law-CriminalConspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 922 (1959).
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protection is the mere joining of all conspirators in one trial."0
Defendants against whom there is little evidence may be stigmatized by being associated with those against whom there is sub20
stantial evidence.
The power to transmute the statements and actions of one
into the crimes of all is the unique potency of the law of conspiracy. The proof of the guilt of those never even seen during an
investigation will come from the mouths of those who could be
thought of as knowing them best-their accomplices in crime.
If there is any doubt, the potency of coconspirator evidence
can best be demonstrated by an example. Assume the charge is
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.2 1 One typical coconspirator statement would be: "A said I had to charge you
$1,200 for the cocaine, so that we all could make something out
of the deal." The declarant and A are codefendants and the former will not testify. The witness is an informer or an undercover
law officer. The statement is logically sufficient to prove every
element of the offense charged. Without the coconspirator rule,
the statement would not be admissible as evidence of any crime
by A-as to him, it would be hearsay. But if admitted against A,
the jury will have little choice but to treat A and the declarant
as one. Unless the declarant is acquitted, this statement virtually
compels A's conviction.
The sole restriction upon the use of such devastating testimony is the preliminary fact requirement.
THE THEORETICAL BASE

Preliminary fact questions pose significant theoretical problems for our legal system. In theory, the jury decides issues of fact.
But most preliminary facts cannot practically be left to a jury
determination. The confusion created and the time consumed by
a nonjudicial resolution would prolong the litigation interminably. 2 A matter might never proceed to final verdict if the court
did not decide issues such as whether a document was kept in the
19.
(1959).
20.
21.
22.

Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 922

Id.
21 U.S.C. § 812 (1972).
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2550, at 501 (3d ed. 1940); 1 C. CHAMBERLAYNE,
EVIDENCE § 81, at 132 (1911); MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN, Preliminary Questions of Fact in
Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REv. 392, 394 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN]. See also Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511 (Mass. 1852);
J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss1/5

6

Kessler: The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigat

The Coconspirator Rule

normal course of business, or whether an assertion was intended
by an action. Indeed, at one point in the law's development, the
determination of preliminary issues was so rigidly controlled by
the court that the substance of the litigation was frequently decided by the court on these preliminary matters.23
To balance the interest of expedition against that of jury
determination of the litigated fact, it was necessary to create a
theoretical model which would permit the allocation of some preliminary determinations to the judge and others to the jury. The
most successful construct is the doctrine of conditional rele2
vancy.
Issues purely raising questions of competency or reliability
will be conclusively resolved by the judge. These issues encompass such technical matters as the qualifications or competence
of a witness, which are tested by any of the scores of factors which
have been held to necessitate the exclusion of evidence.2 Preliminary issues which raise questions of the probative force of evidence must, however, be left to the jury. To remove such relevancy questions from the jury's determinations would be to re2
strict or destroy the jury's function as trier of fact.

The crucial factor is whether the relevance of evidence depends upon the existence of the preliminary fact. If it does, the
preliminary issue must be decided by the jury. An example of
such a preliminary fact is:21
[W]hen a spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to
X, it is without probative value unless X heard it.
Application of this theoretical model to the admissibility of
coconspirator statements produced a two-step procedure which is
still followed by many courts. The existence of a conspiracy and
the nondeclarant's membership are perceived to be questions of
conditional relevancy. As such the court preliminarily tests them
for sufficiency28 and then submits the matter to the jury for an
23. Cf. Gila Valley Great & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 102 (1914); Cole v. Cole, 153
Ill. 585 (1894); Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508 (Mass. 1852). See also MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 397, 413, 414; 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, 10412], at 10418.
24. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, 45-46 (4th ed. 1963).
25. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, 104[01].

26.

FED.

R.

EvID.

104(b) (Advisory Committee Note).

27. Id.
28. The standard by which the court must test the sufficiency of the evidence is the
prima facie case. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974): "As a preliminary
matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least
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ultimate determination.29
The uniformity created by adherence to this approach, how-

ever, has not been maintained. Further development of a general
model of judge and jury functions leads to the recognition of a

unique type of fact situation. In this situation the preliminary
fact and the ultimate fact of the litigation are the same. Their
merger distorts the significance of the bifurcated screening process. Their unity means that the jurors are given the task of
deciding the preliminary issue, and are then told that, if they

resolve the issue favorably to the prosecutor, they must redecide
the identical issue using additional evidence. This was perceived

to be confusing and futile." It was futile because the jurors were
not believed to have the capacity to receive the evidence, and

then erase it from their minds while considering the preliminary
issues.3 1 Permitting the jurors to hear the questionable evidence
enough to take the question to the jury." See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612
(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Oliva, 497 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rodrigues, 491 F.2d 663,
666 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Morton, 483 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d
804, 807 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43, 44 (7th Cir. 1967).
For the proposition that only slight evidence is required to connect defendant with
the conspiracy (i.e., slight evidence is enough to establish, prima facie, defendant's
connection) see United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. De Lazo, 497 F.2d 1168, 1170
(3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Overshon, 494 F.2d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 1974).
Only the Second Circuit permits admission on less proof where preponderance is the
standard. United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cohen, 489 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
29. The traditional conspiracy charge commands the jury to consider the coconspirator statements after determining the existence of a conspiracy:
Whenever it appears beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case
that a conspiracy existed, and that a defendant was sure of the members, then
the statements thereafter knowingly made and the acts thereafter knowingly
done by any person likewise found to be a member, may be considered by the
jury as evidence in the case ....
1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAN, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 29.06 (2d ed.
1970). Those circuits presently following this procedure include the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh
and Tenth. See United States v. Wilkinson, 513 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Pennett, 496 F.2d 293, 296-97 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fontenot, 483 F.2d 315,
324-25 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 203 (4th Cir. 1968).
30. MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 407 n.47.
31. See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1950); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in
Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (1929);
MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 407 n.47; 9 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2550, at 501
(3d ed. 1940). But cf. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969): "Al-
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was thought to violate the concept of jury protection. 2 Once the
jurors heard the evidence, they would use it even if they decided
it should be rejected. Juries had to be protected from hearing
potentially inadmissible testimony. From such a policy base it
appeared foolish to let the jury decide any admissibility issue. Of
course, to effectuate this policy the judicial determination of the
preliminary issues was to be made in a hearing held out of the
jury's presence."
The proposition is compelling. It cannot be denied that optimism motivates the decision to ask the jury to twice decide an
issue such as whether the existence of a conspiracy has been
proven. But the minimal denial of reality affected by such an act
seems worthwhile when the alternative apparently leads to far
greater conflicts with reality.
Application of the revisionary rule has revealed its flaw. To
protect the jury and to avoid redundancy some courts changed
their procedure for deciding preliminary issues of fact in coconspirator statements. The revision was the adoption of a procedure
by which the judge decided the admissibility of coconspirator
statements.34 Over time, that decision led to another revision.
though the proof aliunde may suffice for submission to the jury, the jury might not be
convinced by it and the utterances might tip the scales." See also Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Comment, The Threat of
Unfairness in Conspiracy Prosecutions:A Proposalfor ProceduralReform, 2 N.Y.U. Rv.
L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 7-8 (Summer 1972); Developments in the Law-Criminal
Conspiracy,72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 987; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in Determination of PreliminaryQuestions of Fact,43 HARv.L. REV. 165, 168 (1929). Cf. Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964);
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.).

32.

MAGUIRE

& EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 394, 416.

33. "The orthodox rule [referring to the judicial dtermination of preliminary questions], then, possesses the merit of protection." MAGUIRE & EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 394.
"But this merit is not always maintained. Judges sometimes admit evidence conditionally
or de bene subject to a motion to strike out." Id. at 394 n.9.
34. This procedure was first adopted by the Second Circuit. United States v. Dennis
183 F.2d 201, 231 (2d Cir. 1950). The trend appears to be towards adoption of this revisionary procedure. A decade later a number of circuits followed suit. United States v. Rodrigues, 491 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 804, 807 (1st
Cir. 1972); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 41-42 (6th Cir. 1965); Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963).
The exact state of the law in the Ninth Circuit is somewhat unclear because of the
language in United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1970):
[Allthough we are mindful of the danger that a jury, in violation of its instructions, may consider the out-of-court statements as well as the independent
evidence in determining the preliminary fact of the existence of a common
scheme or plan, we believe that any change in the allocation of existing functions between judge and jury must await direction from the Supreme Court.
See also United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Since the judge was to decide the issue, the standard of proof he
applied was adjusted in at least one circuit so that it more closely
paralleled other preliminary facts. 5 The proof requirement was
thereby lowered to something less than a prima facie case." Its
exact standard is both vague and varied.
Once the level of proof was reduced, the ultimate revision,
induced by this adherence to a purely evidentiary theory, was
adopted in some circuits. These circuits admit coconspirator
statements even if the jury has found that there was no conspiracy. 17 One circuit has even permitted admission of coconspirator
statements on a substantive count despite the fact that the trial
court had dismissed the conspiracy for insufficiency. 8 The irony
of the result is disregarded. The analysis follows logically from the
39
initial construct:
The determination of whether hearsay declarations are admissible under the "co-conspirator" exception to the hearsay rule
does not rest on finding sufficient evidence to submit a charge
of conspiracy to the jury ....
The result, however, is absurd. A necessary precondition to
the relevancy of the declarant's statements to his codefendant A
is the existence of another fact. That fact is the existence of a
conspiracy. Conspiracy creates the quasi-agency relationship that
justifies using the statement against A. If no conspiracy exists, A
was not in an agency relationship with the declarant. Without the
relationship there can be no vicarious liability for acts or statements.4 0
35. See, e.g., United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 1967); Carbo v.

United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
231 (2d Cir. 1950).

36. United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970). See, e.g.,
United States v. Pennett, 496 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1974); Marks v. United States, 383
F.2d 805, 809-10 (10th Cir. 1967).
37. United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683, 692 (2d Cir. 1974); Ottoman v. United
States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. United States v. Cafaro, 455 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
39. Id. at 326.
40. The technical argument that a lesser standard of proof is sufficient because the
matter is only one of competency, and that a jury verdict of no conspiracy is therefore
not inconsistent with admission of the evidence based on the judge's finding of a lower
standard cannot be supported. The imputation of the declarant's statement is lawful only
if there is a conspiracy-an agency relationship. As a fact of conditional relevancy this
has long been a jury determination. For the purpose of criminal trials, the fact that such
a relationship exists cannot be decided by a standard less than proof beyond a reasonable
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If the statement were, "I have the cocaine," and if the charge
is conspiracy and sale of a controlled substance, a finding that the
conspiracy does not exist renders declarant's possession of cocaine totally irrelevant to A." Permitting admission in this circumstance mocks the principles upon which the coconspirator
rule is founded.2
Similar problems exist in the application of the rule to joint
ventures. Although most circuits have not considered the issue,
one circuit has affirmed a conviction in which the adequacy of the
proof of the preliminary facts of the joint venture was not adjudicated by the jury.43 But joint venture is a theory of admissibility
identical to the coconspirator rule. The only difference is that
there is no conspiracy charge in the indictment." The preliminary
doubt. A finding of a prima facie case on the issue-the procedure the judge follows in
the First, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits-does not even purport, on its face, to decide
that the agency relationship exists. Yet if there is no B, there can be no reliance on A.
41. This relevancy issue could also be analyzed under general principles of relevancy.
A statement may be rendered admissible without the bar of the hearsay rule by the
operation of the coconspirator exception. It is not, however, made relevant to the nondeclarant by the exception. Relevancy comes from proof of a condition of fact. Proof of this
fact is a requirement of relevancy (FED. R. EVID. 401) and competency (FED. R. EvID. 801).
In the above example, the requirement of FED. R. Ev. 401 cannot possibly be met.
Therefore, the evidence may not be used even if it meets the terms of the coconspirator
exception.
42. To permit hearsay evidence to support a substantive charge on the
theory of the "conspiracy" exception where the charge of a conspiracy has been
specifically rejected by the jury would not only undercut the very foundation of
the exception, but would magnify the dangers to the liberty of the individual
and the integrity of the judicial process ....
United States v. Lucido, 486 F.2d 868, 870 (6th Cir. 1973).
43. See United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on othergrounds
sub nom. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). Though the issue was not discussed
therein, a jury finding was sustained despite the fact the jury was never asked to decide
the preliminary issues. For the peculiar facts of Alsondo they were not so charged because
a conspiracy charge was included in the indictment. When conviction on the conspiracy
was reversed by the court of appeals for insufficiency, the only means in the entire record
by which the introduction of the coconspirator statements could be justified was the joint
venture theory.
The Ninth Circuit has specifically ruled that the jury must decide the preliminary
fact question in joint venture cases. United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.
1973).
44. "Joint participants in crime may be denominated conspirators. Proof of joint
action to defraud is tantamount to proof of a conspiracy. . . ." United States v. Snyder,
505 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1974). See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th
Cir. 1973) (joint venture and conspiracy considered twin brothers); United States v. Hoffa,
349 F.2d 20, 41 (6th Cir. 1965). "The notion that the competency of the declarations of a
confederate is confined to prosecutions for conspiracy has not the slightest basis." United
States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1943).
[lit is this committee's understanding that the rule is meant to carry forward
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facts necessary for admission are the same.45 Since there is no
conspiracy charge, however, the jury will never have the opportunity to determine whether or not there was a conspiracy; the
ultimate issue and these preliminary issues do not merge. Therefore, the decision by a judge that a conspiracy exists means that
the conditional relevancy of the statement will have been decided
by the judge. None of the policy bases which theoretically justified removing this issue from the jury applies since the issues do
not merge. The relevancy issue is removed from the jury: the
defendant is deprived of a jury trial on a crucial fact issue for no
other reason than that the procedure conforms to the practice in
conspiracy cases." Logical consistency has become a higher value
than the right to a jury trial.
The effect of removing the preliminary issue from the jury
has been to permit hearsay to "lift itself by its own bootstraps."'
Adherence to a superficially logical theory has permitted the
courts to distort reality, while simultaneously providing a rationale through which they can avoid confrontation with their fundamental corruption of the coconspirator rule.
THE IMPACT OF RULES 801,

104

AND

401

The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not focus
upon the preliminary fact problems created by the coconspirator
rule. Neither the text nor the commentaries indicate the slightest
recognition of the issue.
The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is perpetuated in Rule 801(d)(2)(E)4 5 It appears as a basis of admission
equal to and independent from the traditional agency exception."
the universally accepted doctrine that a joint venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this rule even though no conspiracy has been
charged.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974).
45. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, 801(d)(2)(E)[01].
46. [Allthough it is possible to draw narrow technical distinctions between
cases involving conspiracy or joint-venture theories, the legal analysis applicable to evidentiary rules must, by its very nature, be the same.
United States v. Buschman, 527 F.2d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 1976).
47. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
48. FED. R. EvID. 801 provides in pertinent part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is . . . (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
49. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
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Independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy and of the
nondeclarant's membership is compelled. Rule 401 imposes the
same proof requirements. As Rule 401 requirements, however,
they are foundation elements for any finding of relevancy. To be
introduced, an assertion must comply with the requirements of
both Rules. Neither Rule 401 nor Rule 801, however, directly
addresses the preliminary fact issues. Preliminary facts requisite
to admission are identified, but the instructions controlling their
application are contained in Rule 104.
Rule 104 adopts a uniform structure to control the decision
of preliminary questions. In the first two paragraphs, the Rule
allocates certain preliminary questions to the jury, while continuing the traditional practice of placing the responsibility for the
resolution of the others on the judge."
Rule 104(b) mandates a jury resolution of questions of conditional relevancy.-" The grant of authority to the judge to resolve
preliminary questions concerning "the admissibility of evidence"
is "subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)."
This rule deprives the court of the authority to decide the
conditional relevancy questions. Any more liberal interpretation
would be inconsistent with the Rules' policy of preserving the
parties' right to a jury determination on the fundamental issues
of the litigation:5 2
If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the
functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be greatly
restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed. These are appropriate questions for juries.
The sole purpose of Rule 104(b) is to mandate jury determinations of relevancy questions. Relevancy, as defined in Rule
50.

FED.

R. EViD. 104 provides in part:

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules
of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.
51. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11,
104[08]. J. CROTCHrr & A. ELKIND,
FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE at 19 (1976).
52. FED. R. EviD. 104, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules at 41 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Notes].
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401, s1 encompasses both logical and conditional relevancy." If the
relevancy of evidence depends upon "the existence of some matter of fact,"55 it may only be admitted pursuant to Rules 401 and
40256 if Rule 104(b) is followed.57 The language of Rule 104(b)
permits no exceptions."
Rule 104 does not authorize the indiscriminate submission of
evidence to the jury. Evidence must first be screened by the
judge. The issue goes to the jury only after the judge weighs the
evidence and decides that it is "sufficient to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition."59 The standard by which the
court is to weigh the adequacy of the evidence is that of the prima
facie case."'
This division between the functions of the judge and the jury
applies to the determination of all preliminary issues. One such
issue is the preliminary fact questions of the coconspirator rule.
Rule 104 must be applied to their admission. Since the preliminary facts in the coconspirator exception undeniably contain
problems of conditional relevancy (proof of the existence of the
conspiracy is required by Rule 401 as well as by Rule 801), Rule
53. FED. R. Evw. 401 provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
It is apparent from the Advisory Committee Note that this section applies to evidence
that is conditionally relevant subject to the provisions' of FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
The problem is one of fact, and the only rules needed are for the purpose of
determining the respective functions of judge and jury. See Rules 104(b) and
901.
FED. R. EvID. 401, Advisory Comm. Notes at 85.
54. See note 41 supra.
55. FED. R. EvID. 401, Advisory Comm. Notes at 84.
56. FED. R. EvID. 402 provides in part:
Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible...
All relevant evidence is admissible...
57. FED. R. Evm. 401, Advisory Comm. Notes at 84.
58. The only exception appears in the general exception set forth in Public Law 93595 (Jan. 2, 1975): "These rules apply to further procedure in actions, cases, and proceedings. . . except to the extent that application of the rules would not be feasible, or would
work injustice . . . ." There should be no exception in this area. The majority rule requires submission of the conditional relevance issue in coconspiracy to the jury. Thus, it
cannot be infeasible.
59. FED. R. Evw. 104(b).
60. If after all the evidence on the issue is in, pro and con, the jury could
reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not established, the
issue is for them.
FED. R. EviD. 104 Advisory Comm. Notes at 42. In a criminal case the jury standard must
be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Any skepticism should be resolved by the Supreme
Court's dicta on this subject in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974).
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104(b) mandates submission to the jury for a finding on the preliminary fact.
Application of this Rule would extinguish the revisionary
practice. By returning to the traditional procedure, the above
detailed provisions would become impossible. Once the jurors are
given the task of finding the existence of a conspiracy by the
reasonable doubt standard, as a condition precedent to their use
of the vicarious admissions, an acquittal on the conspiracy would
simultaneously resolve the admissibility question. A finding of no
conspiracy on the substantive count would be a binding decision
on the preliminary issue. The standard is the same. The illogical
and prejudicial inconsistencies of the new rule would vanish. If
there is no conspiracy, there will be no vicarious liability for a
coconspirator's statements."
The only possible barrier to the application of Rule 104(b) to
the resolution of these issues would be a viable analysis of the
coconspirator preliminary fact issues which negated all issues of
conditional relevancy. Rule 104(b) is applicable only to issues of
conditional relevancy. Without such an issue, Rule 104(a) would
control and the decision would be made by the judge. But, such
an analysis is not possible.
The first argument against the theory that no conditional
relevancy issue exists stems from the commentary to the Rules.
It contains two examples of conditional relevance. Proof of an
agency relationship is one of those examples:"2
[I]f a letter purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish
an admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y wrote
or authorized it.
The existence of authority issue is the agency equivalent of
the existence of a conspiracy issue within the coconspirator exception. The parallel is particularly evident in such statements
as "the cocaine is available at $1,200 an ounce," or "I'll have the
stuff tomorrow." If these statements are to be vicariously attributed to the nondeclarant, a conditional relevancy issue is undeniably raised. They cannot relate to the nondeclarant unless the
61. Obtaining this result, while creating as little confusion as possible for the jury in

reaching its ultimate decision, must be a task for the judge. He must reevaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence on the counts in light of the jury's rejection of the conspiracy

charge. To secure justice between the parties, he must also consider whether the fairness
of the verdict may have been affected by the jury's knowledge of the now inadmissible
statements. Cf. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969).
62. FED. R. EviD. 104(b), Advisory Comm. Notes at 41 (emphasis added).
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fact of conspiracy is proven. This type of statement is but one of
many that are encompassed by the coconspirator rule. As to some
statements, the competency issue may be more pronounced; however, both elements exist in all of these declarations. 3
In fact, no analyst has denied the existence of relevancy issues. Those favoring a judicial resolution have settled upon an
analysis which accepts two interpretations. One interpretation is
competency, the other relevancy. This analysis then confesses
that choice is impossible."4 The Rule 104(b) problem is thus not
to be solved with reference to the Rule. Instead, it is suggested
that a policy analysis should take precedence over the language
of the Rule. The policy referred to is the confusion and futility
created by twice giving the jury the same issue. Its source is the
merger between the ultimate and preliminary issues. 5
It is contended herein .that the Rule does not permit such a
resolution. Rule 104(b) was enacted to guarantee a jury determination of matters of conditional relevancy. Agency is specifically
identified as a conditional relevancy issue. It is a requirement
imposed by Rule 401. Its character does not change because it and
the ultimate issue are the same. Nor does its importance diminish
because Rule 801 imposes the same requirement. Once it has been
demonstrated that there is a relevancy issue, Rule 104(b) mandates its submission to the jury. The Rule contains no exception
for situations in which the ultimate and preliminary issues merge.
Without a stated exception, the policy of leaving such issues with
the jury cannot be disregarded. Indeed, the absence of any provision for a different procedure in a merger situation, even in the
Advisory Committee Notes, suggests that the revisionary procedure was intentionally rejected. In any event, an analysis of Rule
104(b) indicates that it mandates submission of the preliminary
issue to the jury.
63. Cf. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary
Questions of Fact,43 HARv. L. REv. 165 (1929).
This overlooks the very gist of the question .

. .

. If A without B is improper

.. . its prejudicial effect is not at all reduced by the circumstance that B is one
of the issues on the merits.

Id. at 186-87.
64. Rule 104 does not clearly resolve the ambiguity with regard to who
should decide the preliminary questions in this area [coconspirators' out-ofcourt declarations] . . . . [S]uch preliminary issues might well be couched in

terms of relevancy and be for the jury under subdivision (b) of the rule. On the
other hand, if they are considered as matters of competence the determination
would clearly be for the judge under subdivision (a).
1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, 104[05].

65. Id.
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A POLICY ANALYSIS
No analysis of this problem would be complete, however, if
restricted to the language of Rule 104. The conclusion that the
preliminary facts should be decided by the jury must be tested
with reference to the impact such a process would have on the
fairness of the proceedings.
The first aspect to be discussed is the law of hearsay. Typically, the preliminary factors to be judged in a potential hearsay
situation relate to the circumstances in which a statement was
uttered. 66 Categorization of the statement as hearsay, nonhearsay
or an exception is determined by reference to these situational
factors. For example, to introduce a statement into evidence as a
dying declaration, the preliminary facts that must be proven refer
exclusively to the circumstances in which the statement was
made. The statement must concern the cause of death and be
made under a belief that death was imminent.67 Similarly, to
admit acts as nonhearsay, the court must find that the action was
not intended as an assertion."8 This situational analysis permits
the court to find that the statement was made in circumstances
predetermined to be sufficiently reliable.69
Only two of the factors comprising the coconspirator rule fit
this mode. They are the requirements that the statements be
made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Their focus is
upon the situation in which the statement was made. They test
the statement and limit admissibility of the extrajudicial declaration to those made in circumstances in which there is no obvious
or overwhelming motive to lie. 0
The other two requirements-that the statements may not
66. See generally FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
67. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
68. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2).
69. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420-26, at 251 (Chadboum rev. 1974).
70. United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844
(1973):
[Tihe trial judge must determine whether, in the circumstances of the case,
that statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability. . . . In most cases the
determination that a declaration is in furtherance of the conspiracy ..
will
decide whether sufficient indicia of reliability were present.
See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, 801(d)(2)(E)[01, at 144-47. See also Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1173 (1954), where it is stated:
Declarations made after the conspiracy ends are particularly untrustworthy.
Once the conspiracy terminates, the interest of every member is to avoid responsibility and shift the blame . . . . The case for admitting only declarations
made during the pendency of the conspiracy resembles that for furtherance.
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be admitted unless there is independent proof that the conspiracy
exists and that the nondeclarant is a member-are, however,
unique in the law of hearsay. Their requirement of independent
proof tells us nothing about the reliability of the statement as a
function of the situation in which it was made. Independent proof
does, however, demonstrate the conditional relevancy of the
statement. Thus, the requirements would be imposed by Rule
401, even if they were not simultaneously elements of Rule 801.
Only in one situation can independent proof assist in testing
the reliability of the statement. When the statement contains
proof of the conspiracy or of the nondeclarant's membership, the
independent proof requirement imposes a burden upon the prosecutor to corroborate the implicating statement.'
Federal law rejects any requirement of corroboration for accomplice testimony. 2 Nonetheless, these vicarious admissions are
too suspect to be permitted without some support for the accuracy of the assertion. In effect, by requiring corroboration of this
type of coconspirator statement, reliability is proven through the
enhancement of the declarant's credibility. But the statement
itself is not made more reliable if it is corroborated; rather, it is
made more credible." Corroborated or not, the statement has the
same inherent indicia of reliability. To the trier of fact, however,
it becomes far more reasonable to accept the statement and to
give it weight if it is supported by other evidence. Thus, when the
assertion proves its own relevancy, the independent proof requirement is a guide to the person who will be deciding the credibility
issue. It tells him how to structure his analysis of the evidence.
In demanding independent proof of the existence of a conspiracy, the courts have attempted to alleviate some of the prejudice that would otherwise affect the fairness of the nondeclarant's
trial. Logically sufficient evidence is not admissible unless its
conditional relevancy is proven. If the statement tends to prove
its own relevancy, it still will be barred unless the credibility of
71. Levie, Hearsayand Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. RFv. 1159, 1177-78 (1954); cf. Beck
v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 600 (10th Cir. 1962). Most state jurisdictions require
corroboration of accomplice testimony as a condition precedent to conviction, not admissibility. See, e.g., N.Y. CrM. P. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1971).
72. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); United States v.
Willis, 473 F.2d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 458 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Adams, 454 F.2d 1357, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972); Patterson v.
United States, 413 F.2d 1001, 1003 (5th Cir. 1969).
73. Cf. United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1107 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
844 (1973); Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 600 (10th Cir. 1962).
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the declarant is corroborated. If these latter assertions were admitted without corroboration, the purpose of the exclusionary
hearsay rule would be defeated. "[H]earsay
would [be permit7'
ted to] lift itself by its own bootstraps.

The analysis of these preliminary factors as competency requirements was induced by the similarity in function between
traditional competency standards and this unique conditional
relevancy-corroboration requirement. In both cases the function
is to prevent the introduction of evidence that may unfairly prejudice a party. But the independent-proof-of-preliminary-facts requirement of the coconspirator rule is not a competency requirement. The requirements are actually guides for the trier of fact.
No matter what the verbiage of the declaration, the independent
evidence requirement instructs the trier of fact how to treat the
proof. If the statement does not prove the conspiracy, he is to
eliminate it from his consideration until he finds that proof in the
record. If the statement does prove the conspiracy, the trier of
fact is instructed to perform the same intellectual analysis, but
the policy reason is different. In this latter situation, the trier of
fact performs the analysis to corroborate the credibility of the
declarant.
It is the fact assessment attribute of this unique requirement
that makes any judicial decision of the preliminary issue inappropriate. The policy behind the rule is to balance the need for the
testimony against its suspect character. The method is the imposition of a procedure through which relevance and credibility are
tested. Since the jury decides both of these issues, it must decide
the preliminary fact question as well. To take the issue from the
jury is to diminish the protection of the preliminary requirement.
The bizarre results caused by giving the decision to the judge
have already been discussed.
The second policy that pertains to the solution of this problem centers upon the fairness of the proceeding. Removal of such
issues from the jury when the ultimate and preliminary questions
merged was motivated by the fear that the jury could not separate
its function on the twin issues. Submission constituted an abandonment of the effort to restrict use of the evidence.75 The defendant was perceived as the prejudiced party. If the evidence was
not admissible the jury should not hear it. Through a similar
74. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
75. See note 32 supra.
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analysis the Supreme Court refused to allow juries to decide questions of the voluntariness of confessions.7
But experience with the revisionary rule has shown that less
prejudice would inure to the defendant by giving the issue to the
jury. The reasons are varied.
One of the strongest reasons stems from courts increasingly
admitting hearsay statements subject to connection." Juries are
no longer protected by an evidentiary hearing conducted out of
their presence. The interest of jury protection is abandoned. Jurors will be burdened with the task of ignoring what they have
already heard, whether they or the judge decide admissibility. In
the modern procedural setting, submission of the admissibility
issue to the jury creates no prejudice to the defendant. As previously discussed, the standard of proof applied by some of the
courts which follow the revisionary procedure is lower than the
precharge screening standard which would be imposed pursuant
to Rule 104(b). Giving the task to the jury, rather than prejudicing the defendant, would further protect him in those circuits.
The revisionist's concern about the confusion and futility of
asking the jury to twice decide the same fact is similarly an insufficient basis to justify taking the issue from the jury. As already
indicated, this is no more futile than telling the jury to ignore
testimony that has been stricken. But a far more important reason exists for submitting both preliminary and ultimate issues to
the jury, despite the possible futility of the act. By charging the
jury that they may not consider the coconspirator statements
until they have found independent proof of the existence of the
conspiracy, the policy that led to the existence of this corroboration requirement is fulfilled. The charge communicates to the
jury the reluctance that exists, as a matter of law, in crediting this
evidence. It tells them that the courts recognize its potential unreliability. It alerts them to the danger of unduly trusting the
statements.
76. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 390-91 (1964); Delli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 (1957). "The government should not have the windfall of having the jury be
influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not
consider but which they cannot put out of their minds." Delli Paoli v. United States, supra
at 248.
77. See, e.g., IAD. R. EviD. 104(b).
Where the exclusion is based on a policy of protections of an interest, nothing
could be more absurd than to violate the interest and then instruct the jury to
repair the damage by disregarding the wrongfully extracted evidence.
Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determinationof Preliminary Questions of
Fact, 43 HAv. L. REv. 165, 169 (1929).
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Even if the direction to twice decide the conspiracy issue
does not reflect the reality of the human decisionmaking process,
the charge will achieve its purpose. Letting the judge decide the
preliminary issue is not an adequate substitute. He has no greater
capacity to ignore what he has heard than do the jurors. 8 If the
task is truly impossible, there is slight reason to believe the judge
will perform it better.
The potent element of the traditional coconspirator charge is
that it directs the jury to follow a procedure. Since it is fair to
assume that the jurors try to follow the law, it imposes upon them
a duty to try to segregate this type of evidence from the rest.
Merely by making that effort, they effectuate all of the policies
that lead to the formulation of the rule.
The final argument of those supporting the revisionary practice is that judicial decision makes no difference because the jury
will decide the issue in any event. 9 They will get it as the ultimate fact. This argument, too, must fail. "To decide B on evidence exclusive of A is quite a different thing from deciding B
with the helpful or harmful influence of A."8 The direction to the
jury to attempt the former creates the possibility that the law's
distinction will be one without a difference. Any risk of prejudice
is removed since the judge decides the screening issue-whether
there is a prima facie case without the statements-by the same
standard that he would follow if he were to be given the ultimate
decision. Submission to the jury cannot injure either party. At
worst it is a "second bite at the apple" for the defendant. 1
Pursuit of the traditional procedure better alerts the jury to
the inherent unreliability of this type of evidence. Since it is the
jurors who will make the ultimate decision, these coconspirator
guidelines that were created to protect against improvident fact
decisions should be given to them. The jurors should be given this
guidance. When they fail to apply it literally, the judge's prescreening prevents any harm to the parties. When they succeed,
the optimism behind our legal system that expects complex
problems to be solved by lay jurors will triumph.
78. See Bergman, The CoconspiratorException, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1976).

79.

MAGWRE

& EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 416.

80. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in
tions of Fact, 43 HARv. L. REV. 165, 169 (1929).
introduction of evidence in a jury determination
court.
81. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11,

the Determinationof PreliminaryQuesMorgan uses this proposition to reject
without significant prescreening by the
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In 1970 the Ninth Circuit sought guidance in structuring the
82
consideration of preliminary facts:
[A]Ithough we are mindful of the danger that a jury, in violation of its instructions, may consider the out-of-court statements as well as the independent evidence in determining the
preliminary fact of the existence of a common scheme or plan,
we believe that any change in the allocation of existing functions
between judge and jury must await direction from the Supreme
Court.
With Rule 104(b), the Supreme Court has provided that direction. The preliminary fact issues must be decided by the jury.
82. United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1970).
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